This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. If mass media are pro…t-maximizing …rms then information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, delivery costs are lower, and customers are on average more pro…table for advertisers. The impact of the size of the electorate is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are derived within a formal model of information demand and supply, and then tested with good results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.
Introduction
There is a vast literature that explains voting behaviour using the tools of rational choice theory. This approach to the study of elections assumes instrumental voting: citizens care about public policies and voting is the instrument used to in ‡uence policy choices, or at least to increase the probability of obtaining the preferred option.
This theory poses some problems, especially since the probability to be pivotal in large elections is normally so low that it could be considered negligible in an optimization process. This criticism can be overcome if we are ready to compromise on what we intend by a rational act. In a weak sense, agents behave rationally according to their perception of the reality, that could be di¤erent from the "objective"state of facts. The probability to be pivotal in a large election is clearly very low, but it is not zero, and the subjective perception of the probability of casting a decisive vote may not necessarily coincide with the in…nitesimal numbers that appropriate but cumbersome calculations would deliver (see for example Uhlaner and Grofman 1986 ). Moreover, voting can be seen as a "low cost-low bene…t" activity (Aldrich 1993) : it is therefore possible that even small changes in this probability might have an e¤ect on incentives to participate in an election. If we accept this argument then turnout should be larger in closer elections, when the probability to cast the decisive vote is higher. Unfortunately, empirical analysis does not deliver any clearcut conclusion. Foster (1984) , after reviewing a number of studies on the closeness-turnout linkage in US elections, concludes that "the perceived probability of a tied election at the state level is not a powerful or reliable factor in explaining across-state voter participation rates in presidential elections". shows how "the extent to which pre-election perceptions matter depends directly on how one measures the likelihood of a close contest". It seems fair to say that evidence is, at best, mixed. This paper will consider another implication of instrumental voting: when elections are closer then information on candidates and platforms should be more valuable since the probability that a vote matters is higher. Although Downs (1957) himself hints both at the "paradox of voting"(low incentives to vote) and at "rational ignorance" (low incentives to gather political information) as closely related consequences of instrumental voting, the second of the two paradoxes has received less attention, in 2 particular for what concerns the predictive implications of comparative static analysis.
Thus, information acquisition should be related to the probability to be pivotal when voting. If the suppliers of political information are aware of this, we should expect their behaviour to be in ‡uenced by marginality. In this sense, the behaviour of the mass media will provide a di¤erent and new test of theories of instrumental voting and of the role of marginality as an incentive for participation in election. This allows us to exploit information not used so far for this purpose.
The second aim of this paper relates to the potential impact of political information and mass media on public policy. Recent theoretical and empirical research clearly points in this direction. Besley and Burgess (2002) , for example, provide evidence on Indian states responsiveness to calamities and …nd that this is associated with the circulation of newspapers. Besley and Prat (2005) show how mass media pluralism can increase the availability of political information and therefore in ‡uence politicians' accountability. More generally, as information plays a key role in agency relations, it is reasonable to expect good information to be important for accountability when decision-making power is delegated to governments (see also Lohmann 1998) . The distribution of political information may also have an impact on redistributive policy as o¢ ce-seeking politicians will target their platforms at voters that are more likely to be aware of them (Larcinese 2005) . In two seminal papers, Strömberg (2004a Strömberg ( & 2004b shows how policy platforms can be in ‡uenced by the fact that mass media disproportionately target some speci…c groups; he also shows how the di¤usion of radio had a signi…cant impact on the distribution of New Deal spending.
Indeed, most people seem to believe that mass media have a relevant impact on citizens'electoral choices. Politicians appear to struggle for media attention and tend to complain when they do not receive enough space on newspapers or airtime on television. Some politicians even blame the media for bad electoral performances. In some countries access to television and electoral advertising during electoral campaigns are regulated and even publicly funded. All this is based on the presumption that media are e¤ective in in ‡uencing voters' behaviour. However, we still lack a formal analysis of the political information market: this paper aims at starting to …ll this gap. An analysis of this sort clearly cannot pretend to identify the broad range of possible media e¤ects. However, by restricting the attention on few observable variables, it is possible to make precise predictions on media's behaviour during electoral campaigns and on voters'motivation. This will clearly also have consequences for our understanding of the possible e¤ects of mass media on voters and public policies.
The theoretical model presented in this paper builds on Strömberg's (2004a) model of mass media competition. Strömberg argues that "the increasing-return-to-scale technology and advertising …nanc-3 ing of media …rms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as tax payers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers". Eventually, this information bias will be taken into account by politicians when proposing electoral platforms and will therefore translate itself into a policy bias. This paper will explicitly model information acquisition and how it relates with the closeness of elections as well as with observable individual and local characteristics. The unit of analysis (the correspondent of "groups"in Strömberg's model) is the British electoral college during the 1997 general election. The attention will be focussed on information supply by newspapers and on newspaper readership across electoral constituencies: this will allow us to derive testable predictions and to implement the empirical analysis.
The paper can be summarized as follows. The next section will present the theoretical model of information demand and supply. Political information can be demanded for a number of reasons, including instrumental voting. Hence, it will be higher in marginal constituencies. Higher demand will induce, in equilibrium, a larger supply of news by pro…t-maximizing media. The revenue per reader received by a newspaper is represented by the price paid for the newspaper plus the amount paid by advertisers per reader. This amount is not the same for all readers and can be expected to be higher for those that are more valuable to advertisers. The cost of producing newspapers is …xed and there is a variable delivery cost. In equilibrium, there is higher information supply about marginal constituencies, as well as about constituencies with a richer and more concentrated electorate. With regard to the size of the electorate, it is possible to identify two e¤ects working in opposite directions, a "group size e¤ect"(larger constituencies should get better coverage because there are more potential readers) and a "collective action e¤ect"(the probability to be pivotal is smaller in larger constituencies and therefore information demand should be lower). In section 3 these predictions will be tested using data from the 1997 general election in the United Kingdom. The test consists of two parts. The …rst will use constituency-level data and focuses on the behaviour of the mass media. We will use data collected from a major national newspaper during the electoral campaign, as well as electoral data and data from the 1991 Census. The second part, instead, will look at voter behaviour using survey data from the 1997 British General Election Study. The results suggest a high degree of compatibility between the theoretical model and the data. 4 
The model
Consider a polity divided into two electoral constituencies and o. Each constituency elects a member of parliament (MP). There are two competing parties L and R each presenting one candidate in all constituencies. MPs are elected in a …rst past the post system. With obvious notation we will indicate the candidates in each constituency with L ; R ; L o ; R o :
Suppose the two candidates in each constituency are chosen independently by parties through a process that is unknown to citizens. This process can be represented for both parties by respective distribution functions F R (a) and F L (a) (with density functions f L (a) and f R (a)) over the support A < + of candidates'type.
For simplicity we will assume that candidate a delivers policy a and, abusing notation, that voters' utility from policy a is a. Policies are determined by the parliament of the two MPs and a¤ect both constituencies. If a is the candidate elected in constituency and a o is elected in constituency o; then the implemented policy will be a =
The net bene…t to citizen in constituency from electing the preferred of the two candidates a L and a R is given by
Analogously B(a oL ; a oR ja ) = 1 2 ja oL a oR j:
Also assume that is marginal and this is common knowledge; i.e., if we indicate with P i (i = ; o) the (common) prior probability that a vote will result decisive, each agent knows that P > P o :
We can think of these probabilities as coming from di¤erent prior beliefs about the distribution of candidates (or preferences) in the two constituencies. For example in constituency the distribution functions F R (a) and F L (a) could be "more similar"than in o. However, also the population size in each constituency will clearly play a role as a larger electorate, with given priors, will reduce the probability of each single vote to be pivotal. This "collective action e¤ect" will be considered in the empirical investigation. A simple way to introduce this e¤ect in the model is to write P i = P i (N i ) where N i is the size (i.e. the number of voters) of constituency i.
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Information demand
To avoid cumbersome notation we will focus on a generic constituency. A citizen's utility from voting when types are known is then W (a L ; a R ) = P B(a L ; a R ): However, the expected utility from an informed voting choice before candidates are selected is given by
For simplicity, and without loss of generality, here we will assume that there is no cost of voting:
Assume voters are ex ante uninformed about candidates and indicate the expected utility from uninformed voting as f W : We can then de…ne the ex post utility of an informed versus an uninformed vote as
Before gathering information, however, the candidate types are unknown. Thus, the ex ante utility of gathering information is
Proof.: See Appendix.
Political information can be demanded for a number of di¤erent purposes. Instrumental voting is just one possibility. A sense of civic duty, for example, may play a role since being informed can be regarded as an important duty for a "good citizen". Political information can also be demanded to understand or forecast public policies and this in turn can be useful for better private decision-making 1 .
Finally, information can be enjoyed as a consumption good and therefore be directly included in the utility function. We represent all this "exogenous" utility from information with and say that total utility from information is
Instrumental voting therefore implies that > 0: Otherwise we should expect = 0; i.e. no demand for political information arising from voting decision-making. Thanks to the following result, we will be able to test > 0 versus an alternative of = 0: 
Apart from politics, newspapers also report about other things, since coverage of various events, culture, sport and so on is also demanded by readers. Each paper has its own mix over these di¤erent forms of entertainment and also its own way of dealing with them. Also, the way politics in itself can be reported is not unique. The depth and the focus of news, as well as possible partizanship, all matter for the reader. We will therefore assume that editorial choices, entertainment content, partizanship etc. are …xed characteristics of each newspaper: this is not an unrealistic assumption in the short run and certainly within the space of an electoral campaign. Thus, we will indicate the expected utility from newspapers X and Y to citizen k in constituency with, respectively, (s X )+x k and (s Y )+y k ; where x k is the utility that agent k derives from the …xed characteristics of newspaper X and y k is the utility she derives from …xed characteristics of newspaper Y: Analogous notation will be used for citizens living in constituency o:
Then we have that citizen k in constituency buys newspaper X if
and buys newspaper Y otherwise. Let us indicate with b the di¤erence (s X ) (s Y ) and with
Newspapers are uncertain about individual preferences, and in particular about the preferences for …xed characteristics. Assume z k is distributed according to a distribution function
which is common knowledge: The corresponding density function is h i : The probability that citizen k in constituency buys newspaper X is then given by
The following assumption will ensure that the pay-o¤ functions of the newspapers are concave 2 .
Assumption 1
Newspapers maximize expected pro…ts. Each reader provides the newspaper with a revenue which is the sum of the price directly paid to buy the paper and the amount paid by advertisers per reader. Therefore total pro…ts in the industry are given by = n 2C; where n is the total number of citizens in the polity and C the …xed cost to produce each newspaper: For the moment, we only consider …xed costs and assume marginal costs are zero. In reality there are variable costs due to printing and delivery but it is also true that the "cost of the …rst copy"is normally the largest by far.
Variable costs will be considered later.
Since we are interested in the market share of newspapers in each constituency we can rewrite the expected pro…t equation for newspaper X as
where n j i is the number of readers of newspaper j in constituency i. For newspaper Y we have Y = X : Since …xed costs are sunk, newspapers are only interested in maximizing revenue:
this implies that newspapers maximize the expected number of readers. Indicating with N i the total number of voters in constituency i; we have
This is a zero-sum game. Therefore a Nash equilibrium of the readership-maximizing game is given by a strategy pro…le
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 is satis…ed, > 0; and N = N o : Then an equilibrium
Proof : See Appendix.
This result tells us that the two newspapers converge on the same news pro…le and that the marginal constituency receives larger news coverage.
So far we focused on marginality. There are a number of other factors that can have an in ‡uence on information demand and supply and therefore should be used as control variables when trying to assess the e¤ects of election closeness. On the media revenue side it is quite realistic to assume that not everyone has the same value for advertisers and that newspapers are capable of discriminating among di¤erent readers. The extent of this discrimination depends on the knowledge that newspapers and advertisers have of the market conditions and of the characteristics of their customers. Thus, we should expect this type of discrimination to become more and more relevant as new technologies improve the amount and quality of such information. Since price discrimination across di¤erent readers is rarely observed, discrimination will mainly occur through information supply.
Another consideration concerns costs. We assumed so far that the marginal cost of producing and delivering papers was zero. Although, as previously said, marginal costs have a relatively minor part in the production of newspapers, delivery costs could still be far from negligible and, more importantly, they could vary substantially across di¤erent areas. In particular, in areas which are densely populated, marginal delivery costs are quite low while they can be sizeable if newspapers intend to reach readers in remote parts of the country.
By modifying our assumptions, and introducing other di¤erences in the characteristics of electoral constituencies, we obtain a rationale for control variables that will make the empirical test more reliable. At the same time this also allows us to implement a direct test of some of Strömberg's results discussed in the Introduction.
Heterogeneity is introduced at the constituency level. In other terms, we assume that the newspapers are not able to discriminate readers according to any other individual characteristic apart from the constituency they come from. Since constituencies are statistically di¤erent, this is the strategy that will be used to implement the empirical analysis.
Advertisers can induce from the constituency a number of other characteristics of interest and are therefore willing to pay di¤erently for marginal readers coming from di¤erent constituencies.
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Assumption 3 introduces marginal costs.
Assumption 3 The newspaper cost function is
and o are the cost of marginal readers.
For empirical purposes we will mainly identify and o with delivery costs.
Now we can de…ne the net marginal revenue per-reader as
The pro…t equation for newspaper j can be re-written as
To ensure that every citizen buys one newspaper and that newspapers have an interest in reaching all citizens we assume the following:
Hence, each reader must be weighted by her "net value". The next proposition provides the Nash equilibrium condition in this case.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-4 are satis…ed and that > 0: Then an equilibrium
Other things equal, information supply is higher in the constituency with larger
On the revenue side we can relate the readers' value for advertisers to factors such as income, age, education etc. The net value of readers for newspapers will then take into account their location and be higher where readers are on average more valuable and lower where delivery costs are higher.
Finally, also the total size of the constituencies, N and N o (the number of voters, or the total population in a constituency ) should play a role. On one side, an increase in N j will attract more news on constituency j (groups size e¤ect). On the other, an increase in N j will reduce the value of news for residents in constituency j; j ; and therefore reduce supply on j (collective action e¤ect).
We will approach the empirical investigation with no prior about the sign of this variable.
We can therefore summarize our …ndings in the following testable proposition:
Theoretical Results Other things equal, information supply is higher in constituencies with a closer electoral race, lower delivery costs, and where citizens are on average more valuable to advertisers.
The e¤ ect of the size of the electorate in a given constituency is uncertain.
3 Evidence
The Data
We will now proceed to verify the compatibility of the theoretical model with data. The empirical investigation will be carried out on the 1997 general election in the United Kingdom 3 . For the purpose of this analysis we will use data from England, Scotland and Wales. The political situation in Northern
Ireland is substantially di¤erent from the rest of the country as the main divide is between Catholic and Protestants rather than on the traditional left-right dimension. Evidence provided is of two types.
First, we will focus on information supply, using the electoral constituency as unit of observation. We will then move to individual level analysis to assess whether there is higher information demand in marginal constituencies.
There were 641 constituencies in England, Scotland, and Wales in 1997. Three main sources of data will be used. First of all we need data about information supply. For this purpose we will use a major national newspaper, "The Guardian", de…ning information supply for each constituency as the number of articles that mention such constituency or one of its candidates during the last 30 days of the electoral campaign. This variable is indicated as N ews. We will then use information about electoral results 4 to measure the marginality of a constituency. A …rst possibility is to focus on the percentage di¤erence between the winner and the runner up. We will therefore use the following formula:
where W is the percentage of votes for the winning candidate and R the percentage for the runner up. The smaller is such indicator the lower the degree of marginality of the constituency. However, to capture the idea of marginality as the probability of casting a decisive vote, the absolute di¤erence in votes between candidates might be a more appropriate indicator. We will consider both possibilities.
One problem with such indicators is that they measure election closeness ex post. This could be justi…ed by a rational expectations assumption: in general, when using aggregate data, there is no reason to expect a systematic bias in expectations within a constituency. Nevertheless, voters'swings are not always well predicted by opinion polls, and this could generate non-random biases in voters' expectations 5 .
One alternative possibility is to use past election results 6 . The main obstacle in this direction We will also use data on the total number of registered voters in each constituency and on the turnout percentage. With the …rst variable we try to gauge the relative importance of the "group size e¤ect"and of the "collective action e¤ect". The percentage of turnout indicates the extent of political participation (in the form of voting) and therefore can broadly be intended as a measure of interest and mobilization by the citizens of a given area.
Other possibly relevant characteristics of the constituency will be taken from the 1991 Census 7 . To capture the role of delivery costs, one of the key variables in the theoretical analysis, we also include population density in the regressions. It seems reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of readers is higher where population density is lower. To capture the value of customers to advertisers, we include variables that can represent the social and economic conditions of the districts. Information on income is not available but proxies have been used, namely the unemployment rate and the percentage of citizenship with high quali…cations (degree and higher). Age can also have an in ‡uence on propensity to consume and consumption patterns (thus a¤ecting how valuable a reader is to advertisers) and therefore has been included. Also, the percentage of inactive population (mainly retired, but also students and permanently sick) has been included: there are reasons (as well as anecdotal evidence 8 ) to think that inactive population, in particular old or sick individuals, should be less valuable to advertisers, since they tend to consume less than average, or are less responsive to advertising.
One possible concern might derive from the fact that The Guardian, like most national newspapers in the U.K., is based in London. This could bias the news in favour of London constituencies both because of a lower cost of news collection and, more generally, because of a larger sensitivity to a nearer environment. This could be particularly relevant for our results on population density, given that this variable is clearly higher in London than elsewhere. For this reason we include a Greater
London control dummy, equal to 1 for the Greater London constituencies.
Finally, we include a "big-shot"control. Since some candidates have naturally a prominent position and bigger visibility during the electoral campaign, it is necessary to single out this e¤ect from what we intend to test. Therefore we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for constituencies where "bigshots"are candidates. By big-shot we intend all the candidates who have been ministers in the current and any past government, the members of the current "shadow-cabinet", and the current leader of the Liberal Democratic Party.
In the second part of the empirical analysis we provide evidence on citizens'usage of newspapers across di¤erent constituencies. This helps us isolating the hypothesis that di¤erentiated supply is a consequence of di¤erentiated demand from the competing possibility that all citizens are interested in marginal constituencies. For this purpose we use the 1997 British General Election Study, a postelection survey consisting of individual observations on people that were interviewed a short time after the election. Our sample consists of 2807 observations. Among other questions, respondents were asked whether and how frequently they used to read newspapers during the electoral campaign, and which paper. In the U.K. the distinction between high quality and low quality (tabloid) newspapers is quite clear-cut and commonly accepted. It is therefore possible to separate regular users of quality papers during the electoral campaign from the rest of the population and try to assess the impact of marginality (as well as of other characteristics) on the demand for political information. The same exercise has then been repeated for regular readers of local newspapers. Data include a number of demographic and economic characteristics of the interviewed individuals, as well as a measure of ideological motivation.
All variables are described in more detail in the Appendix and summary statistics are reported in 
Empirical Speci…cation
Preliminary data analysis suggests that a very limited number of constituencies get a disproportionate attention from media (see Tab. 2). For example almost 90% of constituencies have N ews 5 while only 3 constituencies have N ews > 100: This suggests that the relationship we want to estimate could be highly non-linear.
(TABLE 2 APPROX. HERE)
A linear regression would indeed deliver quite poor results. We will instead present estimates for the following equation:
where:
ln(N ews i ) is the natural logarithm of N ews 9 , D is a measure of marginality, X is a threedimensional vector containing the population density, the size of the electorate, and turnout (therefore variable. However, to be able to use logarithms, we need to approximate the zeros, and this could be intepreted as a sort of censoring, although at an in…nitesimal value 10 . Moreover, the large number of zeros (as well as the presence of a few outliers) might constitute a possible cause for concern. It is then reasonable to ask how robust the results are to the usage of alternative estimation methods. For this reason simple probit 11 and ordered probit 12 models have also been estimated: these deliver results very similar to those reported here. These estimates are therefore not reported but are available from the author upon request.
Almost all the parameters have an expected sign in terms of our model. However, the main parameter of interest is 1 : In general, we want to assess if 1 is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. As discussed previously, we will consider several possible measures for the marginality of constituencies, and we expect a positive impact of marginality on news supply.
The other variables serve as controls with respect to this aim; at the same time they are of interest for their own sake as we can use these estimates to assess the overall reliability of the theoretical model.
It is important to distinguish alternative competing possibilities from the hypothesis that larger news supply is a consequence of higher demand. This task will be accomplished by estimating an equation of newspaper readership at the individual level. The equation to be estimated in this case is given by
where N R stands for "newspaper readership" and is a binary variable equal to 1 for, respectively, a quality paper reader (results reported in Tab. 4) or a local paper reader (Tab. 5). W is a vector of individual control variables including, among other covariates, income, education, sex and age.
We expect 1 to display a positive sign indicating that newspaper readership is larger in marginal constituencies, as predicted by the model.
Results
OLS estimates of equation (16) are reported in Table 3 . In column 1 and 2 we use ex post indicators of marginality (based on percentage distance in column 1 and absolute distance in column 2). In both cases ex post distance has the expected sign and is signi…cant at 5% level. Other variables also display the expected signs. Population density has a positive impact and is signi…cant in speci…cations (1), (2) and (3). The signs of other control variables show good support for some of the Strömberg-type conclusions. In particular, and di¤erently from Strömberg, we saw that the e¤ect of group's magnitude is not necessarily uncontroversial. However, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the e¤ect of the group size should overcome the potential collective action problem generated by size. In particular, in column 2, where we use the absolute distance between candidates and therefore isolate the potential "group size e¤ect", both the magnitude and signi…cance of the electorate size are larger than in the other cases.
Results are di¤erent for Turnout, also a potential signal of attention to political matters. It is in fact rather puzzling that its coe¢ cient, although never signi…cant, assumes a negative sign. One obvious concern is that Turnout is also an ex post variable. Moreover, it can be correlated with marginality.
Therefore we repeat all estimations dropping Turnout and verifying that none of our results is a¤ected in any substantial way. In column 5 we report the estimation of column 4 when Turnout is dropped; the other cases are not reported but they also show basically no variation.
Good support for our model also comes from other indicators like the unemployment rate: we use this variable as a proxy for the level of well-being in a given constituency (and therefore for the value of its inhabitants to advertisers). Other covariates give a less clear-cut picture. As previously mentioned, anecdotal evidence has been reported of television programmes that have been suspended because watched mainly by the elderly, who were judged not valuable by advertisers. However we …nd that constituencies with larger inactive population (mainly represented by retired people) receive more attention from newspapers. In fact, inactive people might have more time to devote to information gathering and, during election times, the retired might also have all the incentives to put a dispropor- In table 5 we consider local newspaper readership. The demand for political information is in fact in many instances satis…ed by local papers, and this seems especially likely when information demand concerns the electoral race in a given constituency. Readership of local papers can therefore be used as another indicator of interest in political matters. Once again, marginality in the 1997 election has a positive impact on the dependent variable. Moreover, this time we also …nd a positive impact of past marginality (almost signi…cant at the 5% level), while living in a marginal Conservative constituency does not seem to increase the probability of reading a local newspaper. Among other things, it is worth noticing that the probability of reading a local newspaper is not signi…cantly a¤ected by income and church attendance (both instead show a strong impact on quality papers); it is instead signi…cantly higher for black citizens (who show instead no substantial di¤erence in their consumption of quality papers) and, perhaps not surprisingly, for residents of Scotland and Wales (the opposite is true for residents in Greater London).
(TABLE 5 APPROX. HERE)
The picture that emerges from these regressions seems to show that higher consumption of quality and local newspapers has occurred in marginal constituencies, although this result does not hold for all the de…nitions of marginality adopted. We can regard this as further evidence that mass media behaviour during that electoral campaign was actually driven, at least in part, by instrumental demand for information rather than a broad and non-instrumental interest in the election.
Conclusion
A central implication of instrumental voting behaviour is the existence of a positive linkage between election closeness and political participation. So far, both the theoretical and the empirical literature have mainly identi…ed participation with electoral turnout. We focus instead on information acquisition: rational decision-making should induce voters to demand more political information when elections are expected to be closer. On the other side of the information market, pro…t maximizing mass media should discriminate between di¤erent electoral constituencies according to their expected marginality. However, price discrimination is hard to implement in the media market: this paper shows, both theoretically and empirically, that the media have a di¤erent way to discriminate, namely targeting their attention (in terms of reported news) to marginal constituencies. This can be due to a genuine higher demand for information arising in marginal constituencies as well as to other reasons, like a general interest of the public in marginal constituencies, or the e¤ort of party leaders to target marginal constituencies. To discriminate between these hypotheses we also provide evidence on voters'usage of newspapers and …nd that quality papers and local papers tend to be more demanded by voters that live in marginal constituencies. Thus, the empirical analysis suggests a high degree of compatibility between the hypothesis of instrumental voting and behaviour in the information market.
Marginality is obviously only one of the many determinants of information supply. Recent research, and in particular Strömberg (2004) , have pointed out that the media can be expected to target customers who are more valuable to advertisers, i.e. those that are wealthier, better educated and younger. The model presented here gives an explicit empirical content to those predictions: by using the electoral constituencies in the 1997 British election as units of observation, we can test these conclusions. Evidence on Strömberg's hypothesis is overall satisfactory: although not all the estimates are compatible with his theoretical predictions, we can safely conclude that there is enough evidence of newspapers targeting their news according to characteristics of the electorate. The results also provide empirical support for the idea that larger groups should receive more attention from the media, although having shown that this conclusion does not necessarily follow from the theory.
If we think that the media introduce a bias in the way people are informed about politics, an issue that has not been explored in this paper, and if this bias can be exploited by politicians, then we can have a "media-driven-bias" in public policy-making. In the context of the model presented here, this bias is combined with an "attention-bias"that should substantially drive politicians to target marginal and a-uent constituencies 16 .
This analysis does not pretend to be conclusive. It raises instead many questions that further research should try to address. On the theoretical side, the model of media competition is still quite simple. New insights could come from explicitly considering the advertising market and the possibility for newspapers to select the combination of political information, advertising and other news they 2 This is an adaptation of condition C1 in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) . Interpretations of this condition in the context of probabilistic voting are also discussed in their paper. 3 The U.K. is a parliamentary system where members of parliament (MPs) are elected in single-member constituencies using a …rst past the post system. Party leaders are candidate to become prime minister, but they still need to win in their own constituency to become MP. There are two major parties, Conservative and Labour, although other parties regularly manage to win in some constituencies. In particular, the Liberal-Democratic party is well established as a national third party. In the 1997 the Labour party obtained a neat victory after 18 years of Conservative ruling. 4 Boothroyd (2002). 5 See Cox (1988) or Kunce (2001) for some problematic aspects of ex post indicators. 6 The best independent variable to capture expected closeness would clearly be poll data. Unfortunately there are no poll data available on each single constituency. 7 The data were recorded at the level of districts, local administration entities with no direct link with electoral constituencies. Most constituencies are contained within the borders of a single district and these posed no problems.
Others (around 25% of them) span over parts of di¤erent districts and in such cases data referred to districts have been weighted in order to get approximated constituency data. The weighting factors have been reconstructed by using the detailed description of constituencies (and their relations with districts and wards) contained in Rallings and Thrasher (1995).
Appendix
Proof of theoretical results
Proof of Lemma 1 Let us consider a generic constituency and introduce the following notation:
An uninformed voter in this case votes for candidate L. Her ex ante utility is
The ex ante (i.e. before knowing the realization of candidates) utility of an informed vote is instead
The second term in the right-hand side is positive by de…nition, therefore W f W 0:
Proof of Proposition 2 The best response function for newspaper j is de…ned implicitly by the …rst order conditions
where ' is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the problem. This implies
and therefore
Now remember that
Being > o from the …rst order conditions we get that s j > s
To satisfy the second order conditions we need the Hessian matrix 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
to be negative semi-de…nite. A su¢ cient condition is, in this case, that each element on the main diagonal is non-positive. Assumption 1, therefore, guarantees that the second order conditions are satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 3
The pro…t equation for newspaper j can be expressed as
The result follows immediately from the …rst order conditions
where ' is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximization problem.
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 2, it is straightforward to show that Assumption 1 is su¢ cient for the second order conditions to be satis…ed. M arginal Conservative Const: Dummy variable equal to 1 for constituencies that were held by the Conservative party before the 1997 election and where the margin of victory in the last election was equal or lower than 10%.
Density: Population density expressed as the number of residents per square mile divided by 1000.
Electorate: Total electorate in the constituency divided by 1000.
Big shot: Dummy variable equal to 1 if one of the candidates in the constituency has been classi…ed as a "big-shot". This means the candidate is either a current or former minister, or a current member of the "shadow cabinet", or the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party.
U nemployment%: Percentage of unemployed, expressed as total unemployed over active population multiplied by 100.
Inactive%. Percentage of inactive population. This is the total of retired, students, permanently sick and other inactive over total residents multiplied by 100.
Average Age: Average age in the electoral constituency.
HighD: Percentage of residents with high quali…cations, de…ned as the number of residents with degree or higher title over the total residents, multiplied by 100;
GLondon: Dummy variable equal to 1 for the Greater London constituencies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: the table reports marginal effects at the mean for continous variables and the probability variation determined by a switch from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. z-statistics from robust standard errors are in round brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: the table reports marginal effects at the mean for continous variables and the probability variation determined by a switch from 0 to 1 for dummy variables. z-statistics from robust standard errors are in round brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Individual level
